

Message Text

SECRET

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42

ACTION SS-30

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R 311215Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8107

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T JIDDA 4459

EXDIS

KUWAIT PASS MUSCAT

E.O.: 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA, SY, YS, YE

SUBJ: PRINCE FAHD DISCUSSES "CARROT-STICK" APPROACH TO
SOUTH YEMEN

REF : JIDDA 4191; JIDDA 4458

SUMMARY: IN JULY 30 MEETING PRINCE FAHD TOLD AMBASSADOR
AND DCM THAT AT HIS REQUEST PRESIDENT SADAT HAD SENT
ASHRAF MARWAN TO ADEN TO INQUIRE ABOUT REPORTS OF TROOP
CONCENTRATIONS AND TO WARN ADEN'S LEADERS THAT SAG WOULD
INTERVENE--WITH EGYPTIAN BACKING--SHOULD PDRY ATTACK YAR.
MARWAN ALSO CARRIED MESSAGE OF SAUDI WILLINGNESS ASSIST
SOUTH YEMEN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT--IF ADENIS WILL BEGIN
GETTING RID OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST ADVISERS. SAUDI GOAL IS
EROSION AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
IN PDRY WHICH FAHD SEES AS THREAT TO ALL OF ARABIAN PEN-
INSULA. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING CALL BY AMBASSADOR AND DCM ON PRINCE FAHD JULY
30, PRINCE SAID SAG HAD BEEN CONCERNED BY REPORTS SOUTH

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YEMEN HAD BEEN CONCENTRATING TROOPS ALONG THE BORDERS OF

THE YAR. WITHOUT ASKING KING FAISAL'S PERMISSION, FAHD HAD THEREFORE GOTTEN IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT AND ASKED THAT ASHRAF MARWAN IMMEDIATELY BE SENT TO ADEN AS A TROUBLE SHOOTER. SOUTH YEMEN LEADERS SUPPOSEDLY DENIED THAT REPORTS OF THE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS WERE TRUE AND OFFERED TO GIVE MARWAN A TOUR OF THE AREAS IN QUESTION.

2. ACCORDING TO FAHD, MARWAN NEVERTHELESS INFORMED SALIM RUBAI'ALI THAT HE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IF SOUTH YEMEN SHOULD ATTACK THE YAR, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A HAND IN THE MATTER. IN THAT EVENT, MOREOVER, THE ARMED FORCES OF EGYPT WOULD BE AT THE DISPOSAL OF KING FAISAL.

3. FAHD WENT ON TO SAY THAT THIS REPRESENTED THE NECESSARY HARD SIDE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH YEMEN. BUT THERE WAS ANOTHER ONE AS WELL: SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT OBJECT TO SOUTH YEMENI ARAB LEADERSHIP PER SE. THEY, AFTER ALL, WERE ARABS AND FAHD POOH-POOHED THE IDEA THEY WERE TRULY DOCTRINAIRE MARXISTS. WHAT CONCERNED SAUDI ARABIA WAS THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN, CUBAN AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH YEMEN BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC THREAT THEY POSED TO SOUTH ARABIA, THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND THE BAB AL-MANDAB.

4. KNOWING OF THE SOUTH YEMEN'S INTEREST IN AND NEED OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MARWAN THEREFORE INFORMED SALIM RUBAI'ALI SAUDI ARABIA WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER DEVELOPMENT AID FOR SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND PORTS. SOUTH YEMEN ON THE OTHER HAND WOULD BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW ALL COMMUNIST FORCES FROM THE TWO ISLANDS CONTROLLING THE BAB AL-MANDAB AND TO TURN THEM OVER TO A JOINT EGYPTIAN-SAUDI OCCUPATION FORCE.

5. FAHD BELIEVED THAT IF SOUTH YEMEN AGREED, IT MIGHT BE A SMALL BUT POSITIVE BEGINNING IN GETTING THE COMMUNIST OUT OF SOUTH YEMEN ALTOGETHER. "WHERE YOU GET IN YOUR FINGER THEN PUT IN YOUR HAND AND THEN YOUR ARM..."

6. FAHD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THOUGH A COMBINATION OF INTER-SECRET

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ARAB PRESSURE AND THE PROSPECTS OF SAUDI SUPPORT, HE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK AT ERODING THE COMMUNIST PRESENCE IN SOUTH YEMEN AND PERHAPS EVENTUALLY DISSIPATING IT ALTOGETHER. IF THIS COULD BE DONE, NOT ONLY WOULD THE YAR BE MORE SECURE BUT THE DHOFAR WAR AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PFLOAG CELLS IN THE GULF WOULD ALSO COME TO AN END.

7. FAHD SAID HE WAS LEAVING ON A THREE WEEKS' VACATION IN EUROPE STARTING AUGUST 10, BUT LOOKED FORWARD TO FURTHER EXCHANGES ON SOUTH YEMEN AND OTHER TOPICS WHEN HE RETURNED.

8. COMMENT: AFTER FAHD'S FOREIGN POLICY ACHIEVEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE RETENTION OF COMIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN (JIDDA 4191) AND HIS WORK IN SETTLING THE SAUDI ARABIA-ABU DHABI BOUNDARY DISPUTE (JIDDA 4458), WE BELIEVE THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO DIRECT HIS AND SAUDI ARABIA'S GROWING PRESTIGE TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH YEMEN- THE MOST IMMEDIATE AND ACUTE SECURITY PROBLEM BEFORE SAUDI ARABIA TODAY.
HORAN

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